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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the airline industry on the route between the U.S. and China by
examining various issues including market liberalization, airline alliances, and airline mergers.
The rst chapter focuses on the liberalization in the airline industry between the U.S. and
China. As a highly regulated industry, the airline industry has been of interest to policymakers
who try to understand the impact and magnitude of airline market restrictions. The aviation
agreement between the U.S. and China restricts the routes as well as the number of carriers and
ights permitted on these routes. An amendment in 2007 allowed additional routes, and in-
troduced new carriers to participate in these routes. This paper examines detailed transaction
data on passenger aviation over a six-year period, and analyzes the impact of the sequential
introduction of nonstop routes. In this paper, I also estimate a structural econometric model
of demand and supply for air travel, which allows me to conduct counterfactual analysis.
The second chapter studies alliances between carriers from the U.S. and China. As in-
ternational airlines have expanded in recent decades, increasing demand for international air
travel between the U.S. and China has prompted U.S. airlines to forge alliances with their
overseas counterparts in China to extend the reach of their networks. An airline alliance is
an agreement between two or more airlines to cooperate on a substantial level, including un-
limited code-sharing between partners. Code-sharing is usually associated with changes in
airfares and tra¢ c volume for related routes. In theory, code-sharing should allow providers
v
of complementary routes to set lower prices, and we can check for this in the data. This paper
uses a ve-year panel data to examine the e¤ects of airline alliances on airfares and tra¢ c
volume in the U.S.-China market.
The third chapter considers the relationship between mergers and code-sharing. Policy-
makers typically view the e¤ect of code-sharing on prices as similar to that of mergers. This
paper tests to see if that holds true in this context. In particular, this paper studies the impact
of Delta and Northwest merger on their international routes between the U.S. and China. I
estimate the price e¤ect on the routes where Delta and Northwest previously code-shared with
each other before they merged. I nd that merger did not have much impact on price in the
markets where Delta and Northwest previously code-shared.
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1Chapter 1
Liberalization of the Airline Industry on the
U.S.-China Route: E¤ects of the 2007 Amendment
to the Aviation Agreement
1.1 Introduction
The airline industry is one of the industries that facilitate the globalization of trade. How-
ever, international air transport has been restricted by economic regulations and government
controls. Under the framework of the 1944 Chicago Convention, when the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) was established to coordinate and regulate international air
travel, almost all international air travel is governed by a complex web of bilateral air service
agreements between countries. For air passenger services, these bilateral agreements focus on
tra¢ c rights, market access, capacity, and pricing. A standard aviation agreement states the
following: the points and routes where a foreign carrier can provide service, the number of
designated airlines, tra¢ c volume, ight frequency, airfare to be charged (which needs to be
approved by both countries in advance), and cooperative arrangements between airlines. The
liberalization of the international aviation market remains a challenge due to economic and
political reasons.
This agreement plays an important role because it governs all of the aviation authorities
in both of the countries. As the agreement has been amended gradually in recent years, the
airline market has been liberalized with respect to route, carrier, and tra¢ c volume. This
paper aims to analyze the impact of such liberalization on price and quantity. Specically,
this paper examines the liberalization in the U.S. and China airline market based on micro-
level data which contains ticket-level information. In particular, I provide a detailed analysis
2of the changes resulting from the amendments to the aviation agreement. While most other
airline-related literature has studied the airline alliances and mergers which are indirectly
a¤ected by the agreement, this paper focuses on the direct impact of the agreement through a
market-by-market study that precisely addresses the impacts of liberalization on each market.
The central question for this paper is: What is the impact of liberalization on price and
quantity in markets that are both directly and indirectly a¤ected?1 A secondary question is:
How does liberalization a¤ect price and quantity through its impact on demand and supply?
The amendment liberalized the U.S.-China airline market by introducing additional routes
and allowing additional carriers to enter this market. By matching and comparing routes,
I examine the link between the amendment and changes in price and quantities. The main
ndings suggest that the amendment in general has led to lower airfares and higher tra¢ c
volume. The opened markets (where direct ights were permitted after the amendment) have
experienced on average a 9 percent reduction in airfare and a huge growth (about 100 percent)
in tra¢ c volume. The potential explanations are related to changes in both air travel demand
and supply. The beyond markets also see a reduction in airfare of 43 percent, depending on
the connection with the opened markets.2 Such results come from the spillover e¤ect based
on the route structure. Intuitively, if an airport is more closely connected to an airport that
is opened up for direct ights, it is more likely to take advantage of receiving a spillover e¤ect
and become more competitive.3
I also estimate a structural econometric model of demand and supply for air travel. The
estimates allow me to conduct a counterfactual analysis, and to measure the consumer welfare
change based on simulations by comparing the simulated equilibrium to the observed actual
equilibrium in a market. I nd a consumer welfare improvement from the liberalization of
the U.S.-China airline industry. These ndings justify the expansion of routes created by the
amendment.
1 In the regression, a market is dened as a directional pair of origin and destination.
2Beyond market refers to the markets where direct ights do not exist. In other words, in a beyond market,
either the origin airport or the destination airport is not a gateway airport (beyond gateway).
3The measure of connection is not limited to geographic location, but is more reected by the ight frequency
between two airports.
3The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
aviation agreement between the U.S. and China, and reviews the related literature. Section
3 provides a description of the data sources used in this paper. In Section 4, a reduced form
estimation regarding the price and quantity e¤ects in several aspects is discussed. In Section
5, a structural model of demand and supply is presented, where the estimation strategy and
results are discussed. An elasticity analysis is presented in Section 6. The counterfactual and
welfare analysis are presented in Section 7. A conclusion is made in Section 8.
1.2 The Aviation Agreement and Liberalization
Although the U.S. has advocated deregulation of international aviation for years, the U.S.-
China airline market has moved towards liberalization very slowly, and remains restricted
when compared with the airline markets governed by the Open Skies Agreements.
A potential reason for this could be the unbalanced incentives that have existed for both
countries at the start of liberalization. During the liberalization process, the U.S. airlines were
enthusiastic about ying to China, while Chinese carriers resisted liberalization. In the early
stage of liberalization, the U.S. carriers did enjoy a competitive advantage in China due to their
customer amenities, carrier alliances, frequent yer programs, and well-established domestic
hubs. One concern for the Chinese carrier was that liberalizing the airline markets between
the U.S. and China would result in di¢ culty competing against U.S. carriers, thereby simply
perpetuating the lead that U.S. carriers enjoyed in passenger tra¢ c at that time. For carriers,
more ights result in losses if they cannot attract enough passengers. However, rapid economic
growth in China has increased demand for air travel between China and the U.S., which has
in many ways accelerated the liberalization process. The expectation is that competitive
advantages in the aviation market are not a permanent phenomenon, and as such, competition
created through the liberalization should ultimately benet passengers.
The U.S.-China bilateral aviation agreement, established in the 1980s as a result of diplo-
matic e¤orts, governs aviation rights between mainland China and the U.S., covering both
cargo and passenger services. This U.S.-China Aviation Agreement of 1980 (the Agree-
4ment) restricts market access to only two designated airlines from each country, with each
being allowed to operate a maximum of two round-trip ights per week on routes between four
U.S. points and two Chinese points in both directions: New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Honolulu (U.S.), via Tokyo or another point in Japan, to Beijing, Shanghai (China). In other
words, the routes between specied cities in the U.S. and China must have a stop in Japan.
Within the U.S., there is further regulation since the Department of Transportation (DOT)
determines who gets to y which routes.
Several amendments to the 1980 Agreement were negotiated in 1992, 1999, 2004, and
2007, leading to expansions in routes, carriers and capacity. It also resulted in increased
cooperation between airlines. The amendments in 1992 and 1999 increased the frequency of
authorized ights per origin country from 27 per week to 54 per week. The 2004 Amendment
expanded authorized ights per origin country to 249 per week by 2010, designated 4 new
airlines (passenger or cargo), allowed carriers from each country to serve any city in the other
country, and permitted unlimited code-sharing between U.S. and Chinese airlines, which was
previously restricted to certain cities. In practice, however, service between the two countries
occurred in three Chinese cities and a few cities in the U.S. The expansion in routes included
nonstop Chicago-Shanghai ights operated by United Airlines and American Airlines, as well
as nonstop Newark-Beijing ights operated by Continental Airlines.
A 2007 Amendment to the 1980 Agreement allowed for full liberalization of the air transport
markets. The Amendment allowed for: unlimited designations of carriers, unrestricted route
and tra¢ c rights, and unrestricted capacity and frequencies on all agreed routes.4 It also
means that at some point, both countries may designate an unlimited number of carriers to
operate the agreed services on the specied routes, with unlimited selection of routes and
unlimited frequencies for the airlines designated by each country. In particular, by the year
2011, authorized ights from airlines on each side were expected to expand toward unlimited
frequencies; both the U.S. and China may designate an unlimited number of airlines (either
passenger or cargo service) to operate on the agreed routes. However, this Amendment does
4The routes are unlimited within a group of cities specied in the Agreement.
5not create free entry, because the government still picks carriers and routes based on the
applications. In practice, the DOT decides which U.S. carriers can operate on which routes,
and the number of routes is still restricted. Up until 2007, only ve U.S. cities (New York,
Newark, San Francisco, Chicago, and Los Angeles) o¤ered nonstop access to three cities in
China (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou). After several new nonstop routes were awarded
by the DOT between 2007 and 2009, additional gateway cities (including Washington, D.C.,
Seattle, and Detroit) came into use as links to China.5
Adding direct routes was considered necessary and benecial for both countries. As the
demand for nonstop ights increased, restrictions led to an imbalance that began to benet
countries other than the U.S. and China.6 Since aviation is a global industry, the unique
nature of bilateral liberalization is that travel restrictions imposed on one partner invariably
benet many other countries that are not part of the agreement. By some estimates, at least
16 percent of U.S.-China air tra¢ c has moved to third countries.
Introducing nonstop ights along a certain route means providing improved options for pas-
sengers in travel time and convenience, since passengers usually prefer itineraries with shorter
ying times and fewer connections. Although nonstop ights are generally more expensive,
they still garner most of the market share (more than 60%) compared to connecting ights.
Any beyond gateway market can make use of the new nonstop routes as connections. Fur-
thermore, more options are always better for passengers. As a result, all of the participating
markets enjoy the benet of expanded nonstop ight service.
In the U.S., the DOT has the responsibility of selecting and awarding routes based on
applications it receives from U.S. airlines. Since the DOTs decision processes are inherently
opaque, for the purposes of my analysis, I consider carrier route selections as an exogenous
factor. My focus, instead, is on the detailed passenger transaction data between 2005 and 2010,
which is used to estimate the e¤ects of the sequential route openings in the airline markets
that took place between the U.S. and China. This analysis will be helpful for policymakers as
5 In international air travel, a gateway refers to the port where customs clearance takes place.
6Student visa issuance increased 64 percent between 2004 and 2006. Travel from China to the United States
is expanding rapidly and visa issuance growth in China is among the fastest in the world. Such growth is
expected to continue.
6they consider further amendments focusing on liberalization.
I focus on the impact of the newly opened nonstop routes in 2007 and 2009. As shown
in Table 1.1, during the sample period of 2005 to 2010, additional nonstop routes between
the U.S. and China were introduced during the years 2007 to 2009.7 While only three cities-
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou-remain as gateway cities for China, new cities also came
into use as gateway cities for nonstop ights for the U.S., including Washington, D.C., Seattle,
and Detroit. In March 2007, the route between Washington, D.C. (IAD) and Beijing (PEK)
started nonstop ights operated by United Airlines. The linking of the two capital cities served
as a new connection between the two countries. In 2009, nonstop ights on routes between
Seattle (SEA)-Beijing (PEK) and Detroit (DTW)-Shanghai (PVG) were awarded to Delta
Airlines, while Newark (EWR)-Shanghai (PVG) route was awarded to United Airlines.
The amendments also facilitated the formation of airline alliances between the two coun-
tries. Table 1.2 shows all the airline alliances. The code-sharing agreements among members
of each airline alliance allow for better cooperation in international markets.
The airline industry has been the focus of many studies and research. A few empirical stud-
ies have looked at airline alliances and studied the risk of price collusion when the alliance was
formed or when the airlines merged. For example, Whalen (2000) and Brueckner and Whalen
(2003) examined international airline alliances, while Armantier and Richard (2006, 2008), Ito
and Lee (2007), and Gayle and Brown (2010) studied domestic U.S. airline alliances. Peters
(2006) and Berry and Jia (2008) studied mergers among certain U.S. airlines. Liberalization
of airline regulations is another topic of interest, with a few studies focusing on the Open Skies
Agreements between the U.S. and other countries. Micco and Serebrisky (2006), for exam-
ple, studied the e¤ect of the Open Skies Agreements related to air cargo service; Piermartini
and Rousova (2009), and Cristea and Hummels (2012) have estimated the price and quantity
e¤ects associated with the Open Skies Agreements. All these previous studies have found
that airline alliances and liberalization are associated with a drop in airfare and expansion in
7The nonstop ights on the route Atlanta (ATL)-Shanghai (PVG) operated by Delta Airlines started in
2008, but were suspended in 2009 due to poor performance coming from weak consumer demand and high fuel
prices.
7tra¢ c volume, which are also consistent with the price and quantity results presented in this
paper. This is because the introduction of nonstop ghts reects the liberalization of routes
and carriers, thus promoting the formation of airline alliances between two or more countries.
However, not much focus has been placed on the U.S.-China market, which is a huge market
but remains regulated under a bilateral aviation agreement. I contribute to the literature by
studying liberalization and analyzing its impacts on the U.S.-China airline market.
1.3 Data Source
The three main data sources used for empirical analysis are provided by the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT). The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (known as DB1B) rep-
resents a 10 percent random sample of airline tickets from the U.S. reporting carriers. The
international portion of the DB1B, unlike the domestic part, has restricted access which re-
quires special permission to as well as substantial security precautions. The data set used
in this paper covers international air travel to and from the U.S. over the period 2005-2010,
and it contains detailed itinerary information for each ticket, including airfare paid by each
passenger, origin and destination airports, connecting airports, travel distance, ticketing and
operating carrier for each segment, and the number of passengers on each itinerary with the
same fare.8
A second data set used is T-100 International Market data, which contains information on
air tra¢ c between the U.S. and China reported by the U.S. carriers, covering di¤erent service
classes (passenger, mail, cargo) at monthly frequency. I focus on the passenger service data in
order to estimate the change in tra¢ c associated with the Amendment.
Another data set used for this paper is the T-100 Domestic Segment data. This rm-level
data set contains information on the capacity and tra¢ c reported by U.S. carrier on domestic
nonstop ights, providing details on carrier, origin, destination, aircraft type and service class
for transported passengers, scheduled departures, and departures performed. I focus on the
passenger service entries in this data set. Since the data is collected monthly, I aggregated
8Distance associated with itinerary for the same origin and destination may di¤er since di¤erent connecting
airports might be used for transferring passenger.
8the number of departures performed for each origin-destination pair (in both directions) over
carriers within a year, then constructed a measure of connection between cities based on the
number of departures for nonstop ights for the empirical analysis.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
Two main questions are addressed in this section: (1) How does the Amendment a¤ect markets
that are directly a¤ected by the Amendment, in terms of price and quantity respectively? (2)
How does the Agreement a¤ect markets that are indirectly a¤ected (that is, they have no new
direct ights, but they can y on the new routes)? I estimate how much of the change in price
and air tra¢ c volume in the opened markets can be attributed to the introduction of direct
ights by comparing with other markets which did not have much change.
Before conducting an empirical analysis of price and quantity changes caused by the Agree-
ment, it is worthwhile to understand price and quantity uctuations that occur with direct
ights within the framework of competition and passenger preference. The introduction of
direct ights increases the variety of routes o¤ered and the change in ticket prices could be
positive or negative. Prices could decrease because of the increased competition as the added
nonstop ights generate more options. In addition, nonstop ights could also lower the unit
cost for carriers, especially when rms start enjoying improved cooperation with alliance part-
ners. Moreover, if new nonstop routes were granted to a new carrier to the market, there could
be a reduction in markups as competition reduces the market power of incumbent carriers.
On the other hand, prices could also increase. Since passengers usually prefer direct ights,
increased demand may push up prices in the market. Firms could also increase prices because
they o¤er choices that match the passengers desired option. The tra¢ c volume is expected to
expand. The increase in quantity of passengers driven by the opening of nonstop routes partly
comes from the growth of tra¢ c on these new nonstop routes, and partly from the growth
in the pre-existing routes through the spillover e¤ects when they use those new routes for
connections. Therefore, it requires an empirical analysis to understand the ambiguous e¤ects
on prices because there is a trade-o¤ between the greater competition due to the new ights
9and the fact that the new direct ights command a higher premium. The empirical analysis
also provides an estimate of the e¤ects on tra¢ c volume in the related routes.
In the following analysis, a market is dened as a directional pair of an origin and a
destination airport. For example, a round-trip ticket from Boston (BOS) to Beijing (PEK) is
a distinct market from a round-trip ticket from Beijing (PEK) to Boston (BOS). This denition
implicitly assumes that the market demand depends on the location characteristics of the origin
airport.
1.4.1 Price E¤ect
The DB1B data is used here to analyze the impact of nonstop ights on price in the markets
that opened for nonstop ights. Specically, I compare the trends in airfare in the opened
markets to those in the pre-existing gateway-to-gateway markets.9
Several lters were applied to the original data set before the empirical analysis. I focus on
round-trip itineraries between the U.S. and China in the third quarter of each year. To limit
heterogeneity, I exclude the business and rst class tickets, as well as tickets with unreasonable
fares to avoid coding errors in price.10 I retain tickets with at most six coupon segments, and
exclude tickets with fares below $100 or above $9999.
Since all the tickets were reported by the U.S. carriers, and it is unlikely that a U.S. carrier
ies any segment within China, most tickets reect travels between a U.S. city and two major
gateway cities in China-Beijing (PEK) and Shanghai (PVG).11 However, tickets with a segment
in domestic China segment are observed if the itinerary is cooperatively operated by a U.S.
carrier and a Chinese carrier. These tickets accounted for over 90 percent of the markets and
passengers in the original data. Therefore, I restrict the sample to exclude tickets on beyond-
gateway cities in China, and remove tickets on the very thin markets to the U.S. cities (which
9The existing gateway-to-gateway markets include: Beijing (PEK) to Newark (EWR), Chicago (ORD) and
San Francisco (SFO); Shanghai (PVG) to Chicago (ORD) and San Francisco (SFO).
10The selection was based on the ticket class code and fare credibility indicator set by the DOT.
11According to the aviation agreement, a carrier is not allowed to y between any two foreign points. A
beyond-gateway itinerary usually takes place in terms of cooperation between a carrier with its foreign partners.
Another gateway city is Guangzhou (CAN), and most nonstop ights to Guangzhou are operated by carriers
from China.
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account for less than 10 percent of the sample). Excluding small and thin markets eliminates
the heterogeneity between large markets and small ones, which is di¢ cult to capture in my
econometric model. The remaining sample is the focus of the empirical analysis. Specically,
I compare the trends in airfare in the opened markets to those in the pre-existing gateway-to-
gateway markets.
The nal sample covers tra¢ c in both directions in 885 markets in the year 2005 and 1,113
markets in the year 2010, and it contains 61,451 records of tickets with 72,889 passengers.12
Table 1.3 reports the summary statistics of passenger air transport between the U.S. and
China during 2005-2010. The average fare increased from $1,401 to $1,747, which is about a
25 percent growth in six years. The only exception is that a 7 percent reduction occurred in
2009.13 The number of passengers on nonstop ights showed a steady increase up until 2009;
in 2010, there was a drop in ight frequency resulting from the suspension of nonstop service
on some routes due to weak demand. Accordingly, the average number of connections had
steadily decreased until 2009, with a small rebound occurring in 2010.
The fraction of outbound tra¢ c from the U.S. accounts for more than half of the sample
each year, even though this number is declining over time. In the full sample, the U.S. outbound
tra¢ c share was as high as 75 percent in 2005, but gradually dropped to 60 percent in 2010.
This is primarily due to a limitation of the DB1B data set, which is a collection of tickets
reported by U.S. carriers, and not foreign carriers.14 As a result, the tickets marketed by
foreign carriers, which mostly originate from China and end in a U.S. gateway airport, are
likely to be under-represented in this sample. However, because of the formation of airline
alliances, the cooperation between carriers from U.S. and China is increasing, and the shares
of both directions tend to be close in the sample.15 As of 2010, the fraction of U.S. outbound
tra¢ c decreased by 20 percent compared to its share in 2005. I therefore include a direction
12The ticket record in a market in a given year has duplications due to di¤erent fares.
13The fares are adjusted by CPI in 2010 dollars. This reduction may reect the relatively high demand in
2008 caused by the Beijing Olympics event, and a decline in demand in the year following this event.
14 It is the marketing carriers responsibility to report the complete itinerary when there is more than one
operating carrier.
15 In an international itinerary involving a beyond-gateway airport, the domestic partner of a foreign carrier
is required to provide service on the domestic segment.
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indicator in my estimation.
A gateway-to-gateway market refers to a market that has direct ights, and therefore is
less likely to make use of any other gateway-to-gateway market as a connection. However,
the newly opened gateway markets may have an impact on pre-existing ones by serving as
substitute connections in any beyond markets between the two countries. The prices are
expected to drop in these pre-existing gateway markets due to the introduction of competition
and the reduction of demand.
I restrict the sample to round-trip itineraries in the gateway-to-gateway markets between
the U.S. and China, which are routes between gateway airports where designated carriers
were allowed to o¤er nonstop ights. Gateway airports, whether the pre-existing ones or new
ones, usually serve as domestic hubs, so they should share similar characteristics. Therefore,
the identifying assumption is that in the absence of introducing nonstop ights, the price
and tra¢ c volume would have evolved similarly in the opened markets as in the pre-existing
gateway markets (comparison markets), and thus any deviation of trend from the comparison
markets could be attributed to the emerging nonstop ights.
In order to evaluate the validity of this assumption, I plot the price trend as seen in Figure
1 for the comparison market with each of the opened markets. All the opened markets followed
the similar trend prior to the year when the nonstop ights started, but they show a deviation
in the year the change occurred. The trends suggest that the deviations were responses to the
introduction of nonstop ights in each of the markets.
This analysis is formalized by the following estimation
Yimt = 0 + AG postAG+X imt + 1m + 2t + 3r + imt (1.1)
where Yimt represents the airfare (log) for a ticket i in marketm in year t; AG is an indicator
for the opened market; postAG is an indicator variable that equals to 1 for the tickets observed
after the market opened up. I control for itinerary characteristics in Ximt (distance, nonstop
indicator, and direction indicator). I also include the year xed e¤ect 2t , the market xed
12
e¤ect 1m, and the carrier xed e¤ect 
3
r . The parameter of interest is , which captures how
the price changed in each of the opened markets relative to the comparison markets. The
estimation results are reported in Table 1.4. I nd that, over the four opened routes, the
average e¤ect of nonstop ights on airfare is signicantly negative. As reported in Column (5):
the introduction of nonstop ights in those opened markets, on average, leads to a 9 percent
drop in airfare.
It is also interesting to look at this e¤ect in each of the opened market, although we do not
have a lot of statistical power in these cases. This is because of the contaminated comparison
group as the pre-existing gateway markets were unavoidably a¤ected by the introduction of
nonstop routes. Interestingly, I get the same negative sign for each market, although it is
signicant in only one case. Columns (1) through (4) report the impact of nonstop ights
on each of the opened markets. In particular, the Beijing-Seattle market had a signicant
17 percent drop in average airfare conditional on other itinerary characteristics, while the
other three opened markets experienced a decrease in average airfare ranging from 2 to 5
percent. These fare reductions might be explained by the increased competition among gateway
markets, as well as the cost synergies from the carriersre-structured route network.
All other control variables display the expected signs, indicating that nonstop ights are
more costly than connecting ights; airfares increase with distance traveled; and U.S. outbound
travel is more expensive than inbound travel.
1.4.2 Quantity E¤ect
The data used to examine quantity e¤ects came from the T-100 International Market sample,
which contains air tra¢ c information on passenger service reported by the U.S. carriers on a
monthly basis. The passenger ows in each month were reported by carriers for each market.
I restrict the sample to markets between gateway airports in China (Beijing and Shanghai)
and any U.S. airports observed in the data set. In particular, given the limitation of data, I
focus on two opened routes: Beijing-Washington, D.C. and Shanghai-Detroit. For the other
two opened routes, there was no record of tra¢ c in the Beijing-Seattle and Shanghai-Newark
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markets before the U.S. carriers started direct ights in 2009, because services in these markets
were o¤ered only by carriers from China, which were not required to report to the DOT.
However, tra¢ c information became available after direct ights were granted to U.S. carriers
as these carriers are required to report to the DOT.
I estimate the di¤erence in tra¢ c volume change by comparing the opened markets to
those markets with the same origin airport that did not experience a change in route. Instead
of including a direction indicator, I consider each direction for a market separately, so that I
can control for the same origin airport and match the demand among compared markets. The
outcome variable Yimt in Equation (1.1) is the number of passengers and itinerary characteris-
tics Ximt includes distance and nonstop indicator. The parameter of interest, , now captures
how the passenger ow changes in the opened markets relative to the other markets. In this
specication, year xed e¤ect, market xed e¤ect, and carrier xed e¤ects are included.
The impact of nonstop ights on tra¢ c is reported in Table 1.5. I nd a signicant increase
in tra¢ c in three of the directional markets, although some of the result came from moving
passengers from Chinas airlines to the U.S. airlines. The tra¢ c in the Beijing-Washington,
D.C. market almost tripled as a result of the introduction of nonstop ights, while the tra¢ c in
the Shanghai-Detroit market also experienced an increase, but the e¤ect was not statistically
signicant. On average, the nonstop ghts have led to a 100 percent increase in air tra¢ c
volume.
Although the other two markets (Beijing-Seattle and Shanghai-Newark) are not directly
observed, they are also expected to have an increase in tra¢ c due to the introduction of
nonstop ights. This increase in tra¢ c comes from the introduction of new nonstop routes,
and also from the tra¢ c growth on the pre-existing routes.
1.4.3 Spillover E¤ect
This section aims to estimate how the Amendment a¤ects the markets originating from any
beyond-gateway cities between the U.S. and China. I compare the beyond markets that are
more-or-less connected to the new gateways depending on how many ights between a beyond
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airport and the new gateway airport. Based on the limitation on data availability, only the
price e¤ect is presented.16
This model is estimated using DB1B ticket level data set and T-100 Domestic Segment
data. The sample contains U.S. outbound round-trip itineraries from selected beyond-gateway
cities to any city in China.
To estimate how the Amendment a¤ects the markets originating from any beyond-gateway
city in the U.S. and traveling to China, I select 17 major beyond-gateway airports (in 16 cities)
in the U.S. that have a signicant number of ights that travel to China. I then examine the
price and quantity e¤ects associated with the three opened markets in 2009. Given the network
of domestic airline routes, the impact of nonstop ights in certain markets on the beyond
markets is expected to lead to lower fares and increased tra¢ c as a result of more options
being available for connections. Such e¤ects may also depend on the connection between a
beyond market and the opened markets.
Now I must dene the measure of level of connection. Specically, as I restrict the sample
to U.S. outbound markets, the measure of connection is constructed as the average frequency
of domestic nonstop ights between a beyond city to the three opened cities (Seattle, Newark,
and Detroit) within the U.S. A city is considered to be more closely connected to the opened
cities if it has a higher nonstop ight frequency with the three opened cities on average. The
level of connection is measured using the number of departures recorded in the T-100 Domestic
Segment Data in 2007, which provides the number of nonstop ights between domestic U.S.
airports. In particular, the level of connection for a beyond city m is
Connectm = log(Avg:Frequencym)
where Avg:Freqency represents the average number of nonstop ights between each beyond
city m and the three cities with opened routes. The level of connection is measured using the
16 In the T-100 International Market data set, tra¢ c information on routes without direct ights is not
complete for my analysis. Similar empirical analysis would be conducted with respect to tra¢ c volume upon
the availability of data source.
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logarithm of these averaged numbers. Table 1.6 presents a list of these beyond-gateway cities
with the nonstop ight frequencies between them and the opened cities. Two cities were
excluded in the calculation of level of connection: Washington, D.C. (IAD) was dropped with
respect to Baltimore (BWI), because BWI airport serves as a substitute airport for Washington,
D.C., and there are very few direct ights between these two places; Seattle (SEA) was dropped
with respect to Hartford (BDL), because the number of direct ights was not available in the
data set.
I estimate the following model
Yimt = 0 + postAG Connectm +Ximt + 1t + 2m + 3r + imt
For each outcome variable (Yimt) representing airfare (log) for a ticket i in market m in
year t, postAG is an indicator variable that equals to 1 for the tickets observed after certain
markets opened (postAG =1fY ear  2009g), and Connectm is the measure of connection. I
control for the number of stops in Ximt, and also include 1t , 
2
m, 
3
r as year, market, and
carrier xed e¤ects. The parameter of interest is  , which captures the impact of direct ights
on the beyond-gateway markets.
Table 1.7 presents the estimation results, indicating a signicant negative price e¤ect of
opened markets on beyond-gateway markets when the nonstop ights started in 2009. More-
over, this impact also depends on the level of connection among the cities: the more closely
a city is connected to opened cities, the bigger the impact induced. On average, the price
has dropped 43 percent in the beyond markets as a result of adding nonstop routes.17 The
price might be pushed up by the increasing demand for the direct ights, as well as by rms
increasing pricing power with new products.
17This result comes from the calculation of the product of ^ and the mean of Connectm: exp(-0.07*8.05)-1=-
0.43.
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1.5 Structural Model
Although the reduced-form estimation shows the price e¤ect and quantity e¤ect associated with
the expansion of gateway airports, this approach is not su¢ cient for policymakers to assess the
Amendment regarding the nonstop ights on certain routes. A structural econometric model
allows us to identify the demand and supply source of price and quantity changes associated
with the introduction of direct ights, and to perform counterfactual and a welfare analysis.
Introducing direct ights into certain markets results in the following changes:
 carriers can o¤er additional itineraries in existing markets
 passengers are provided with more options when booking a ight
In each market, a travel product is dened as a combination of carrier alliance, number of
stops, and gateway type (either the gateway airports in the U.S. or China, or a gateway airport
located in a third country that could be used as a connection). For a connecting itinerary, it
must make use of one of the gateway airports. Depending on the carriersnetwork structure, it
is very likely that the connecting gateway airport is in a third country near the U.S. or China.
In fact, most of such third-country gateway airports are located in Japan and Canada.18
I assume all of the observed products are provided by three rms, or the three airline
alliances. The airlines ying between the U.S. and China cooperate in airline alliance and
Code-sharing. As shown in Table 1.2, by 2010, Star Alliance includes Continental Airlines,
United Airlines, and Air China, while Sky Team Alliance includes Northwest, Delta, and China
Southern Airlines. American Airlines is a member of the OneWorld alliance, and China Eastern
code-shares with several OneWorld members although it is not a member. Airline alliances
and code-sharing are intended to increase passenger tra¢ c on each participating airline by
allowing broad frequent yer program benets and increasing the number of ights that an
airline can o¤er in the international air travel market.
18The third-country gateway airports include Tokyo (NRT) in Japan and Toronto (YYZ) in Canada, as well
as Hong Kong (HKG) in China, Seoul (ICN) in South Korea, etc.
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For all the markets covered in the sample, I focus on the round-trip tickets and collapse the
data by averaging the price and aggregating the number of passengers so that each product has
a unique observation in each market for each year. The nal sample contains 2,202 markets
with 7,040 products that are o¤ered by three rms (airline alliances) over the 6-year period.
For all the directional origin-destination markets, the number of products ranges from 1 to 23.
A new product refers to a travel product which makes use of any new gateway airport
as a connection. In other words, if a product is connected by one of the new nonstop ights
(Beijing-Washington, D.C. or Seattle; Shanghai-Newark or Detroit), then it is considered to be
a new product. As the four new nonstop routes came into service, all new products appeared
after 2007 and covered about 20 percent of the passengers from 2007 to 2010. All of these
products are grouped by carrier alliances because passengers who usually invest in a frequent
yer program among one of the airline alliances consider the products from the same alliance
as a closer substitute when making an airline choice. The outside option in each market refers
to air travel products that are not included in this data set, as well as the option of not ying.
For example, the outside option could be a product o¤ered by single or multiple airlines from
other countries other than the U.S. and China, and they are not required to report to the
DOT.
1.5.1 Model
Demand Following recent empirical work by Peters (2006), Berry and Jia (2008), Gayle
and Brown (2010), all examining the recent airline mergers, I use a discrete choice framework
to model the demand for air travel, in particular, a nested logit model. Each passenger i in
market l during period t chooses among Jtl+1 products, with the outside option being j = 0.
The nested logit model allows for a more reasonable substitution pattern than the simple logit
model. The nested logit model allows correlation in consumer tastes within nests, by including
a measure of degree of independence in unobserved utility within nests.
Products in a market are assumed to be grouped by rm (i.e., airline alliance), which are
mutually exclusive. I assume that we have G+ 1 mutually exclusive groups, g = 0; 1; 2; :::; G,
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and the outside option is the only product in group 0. According to how a product is dened,
a group refers to a set of products o¤ered by the same rm in a market.
Consumer is utility from product j is given by
Uijtl = jtl +  itlg + (1  )ijtl
where jtl is the mean level utility across consumers choosing j, itlg is a within group
random component (common across products in the same group, and depends on ), and ijtl
is an identical and independently distributed extreme value. The parameter  2 (0;1) measures
the correlation of a consumers utility across products within the same group. As  approaches
1, the correlation of utility level within the same group increases, and as  approaches 0, such
correlation goes to zero.
The mean level utility jtl is given by
jtl = Xjtl   pjtl + jtl
where Xjtl is a vector of observed product characteristics (distance, number of stops,
whether the origin is hub for the carrier or its airline alliance), pjtl is the price of product
j, and jtl represents unobserved product characteristics, such as product quality and airline
reputation, which are likely to be correlated with price.  and  are the marginal utilities
associated with observed product characteristics and price respectively.
For each year, in market l, the predicted group share of product j is given by
sjjg(; ) =
ej=(1 )
Dg
where Dg =
P
j2Fg
ej=(1 ). The predicted share for group g is
19
sg(; ) =
D
(1 )
gP
g=0
D
(1 )
g
=
D
(1 )
g
1 +
P
g=1
D
(1 )
g
The last equality holds because the outside option is the only member in group 0, and we
normalize 0 = 1; therefore D1 0 = e
0 = 1. Hence, the market share of product j is given by
sj(; ) = sjjg  sg = e
j=(1 )
Dg [1 +
P
g=1
D
(1 )
g ]
(1.2)
The demand parameters to be estimated are d = (; ; ).
Supply Following the prevailing literature in the airline industry, I assume that the marginal
cost is constant and log linear,
ln(mcjt) =Wjt + !jt
where Wjt is a vector of observed marginal cost shifters, and !jt captures unobserved cost
shocks.
Suppose there are G rms in a market, each rm g produces a subset of products in each
market Fg. In each market, the market demand for a product j is given by
dj =M  sj(x; p; ; d)
where M represents the market size, which is given by the population in the origin city. Based
on the market demand, rm gs prot in a market is given by
 =
X
j2Fg
(pj  mcj)M  sj(x; p; ; d)  Cj
where Cj is the xed cost of production. Under the Bertrand-Nash assumption, the price
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for each product, pj , must satisfy the rst order condition
sj(p; x; ; d) +
X
k2Fg
(pk  mck)@sk
@pj
= 0
By dening the matrix , which is
jk =
8<: @sk@pj ; if (k; j) are offered by the same firm0; otherwise
the rst order conditions can be represented in matrix notation
s(p; x; ; d) :(p mc) = 0
Assume the existence of pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices for the airline
industry, the marginal cost is solved as
mc = p  1s(p; x; ; d)
The price equation implies
ln[p  1s(p; x; ; d)] =W + ! (1.3)
Under the nested logit setting and the market share given in Equation (1.2) , each element
in matrix (; ) can be expressed in terms of market shares, which can be analytically solved
as
@sj
@pj
=  @sj
@j
=

   1sj[1  sjjg   (1  )sj]
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@sj
@pk
=  @sj
@k
= sj[

1  skjg + sk] ; for k 6= j
Given ^ and ^are estimated from the demand side, the marginal cost parameters  in price
equation (1.3) can be estimated by linear estimation.
1.5.2 Estimation
The estimation strategy that I use here follows Berry (1994). I rst estimate the demand
equation by itself, and then interpret and discuss the results. I then turn to the supply side
estimation using the demand parameter estimates, where the marginal cost is recovered. These
will be used to simulate prices for the counterfactual and welfare analysis in the following.
Instrument In the demand equation, price and within group share (pj and Sjpg) are endoge-
nous as they are likely to be correlated with unobserved product characteristics captured in
j . It requires that valid instruments should be uncorrelated with residual and correlated with
endogenous variables. These potential instruments are motivated by supply theory, including
the level of competition and rival products. Both level of competition and potential substitutes
are correlated with price and within group share as they are related to a products markup. I
include the following instruments in the estimation:
 number of rms in the market
 number of competitor products in the market
 number of other products o¤ered by an airline in the market
 mean number of itinerary stops across products o¤ered by an airline in a market
Demand Estimation In the nested logit model, following Berry(1994), the mean level
utility can be analytically solved, and the parameters are chosen such that the observed product
shares are equal to the predicted shares. The estimation equation is
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ln(Sj)  ln(S0) = Xj   pj + ln(Sjpg) + j
whereXj is a vector of observed product characteristics, including number of stops, nonstop
indicator, and itinerary distance. The demand equation estimates are reported in Table 1.8.
The rst column reveals the OLS estimates, which ignores the endogeneity of price and within
group share (pj and Sjpg), therefore the estimated coe¢ cient on price and  will be inconsistent.
I will focus on the results reported in the second column, where appropriate instruments are
included in estimation.
All the coe¢ cient estimates have the expected signs, and are statistically di¤erent from
zero. Products price has negative e¤ect on the utility. As measure of convenience for an
air travel product, number of stops and distance both have negative coe¢ cients. A negative
coe¢ cient on the number of stops for a product indicates that passengers are more likely
to choose a product with fewer intermediate stops. Similarly, the utility decreases with the
distance of the air travel. The coe¢ cient on the nonstop indicator is positive, revealing the
fact that nonstop ights are more popular than other choices in a market. The estimate of
 (sigma) is signicantly greater than zero, and the magnitude is very close to zero. Since
 measures the correlation of utility obtained from products o¤ered by the same rm, the
estimate provides evidence that passengers demonstrate loyalty to an airline alliance, even
though it is not very strong.
Marginal cost parameter estimation The observed marginal cost shifters include itinerary
distance, a nonstop indicator, and a hub indicator of origin airport for operating carrier. The
year, carrier, and market xed e¤ects are included in the estimation. Data from 2005 to 2006,
collected prior to the introduction of new products, is used to estimate the marginal cost pa-
rameters in Equation (1.3). The parameters are estimated by ordinary least square based on
the demand estimation ^d. Table 1.9 presents the estimates of marginal cost parameters. All
of the coe¢ cients on Distance, Hub and Nonstop have the expected signs, and are statistically
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di¤erent from zero. This nding suggests that marginal cost increases with distance, and that
the marginal cost is higher if the origin airport is a hub for the operating carrier, but is lower
for a nonstop ight.
1.5.3 Elasticity
On the demand side, I use the demand parameter estimates to calculate the own- and cross-
price elasticities among rms for each opened market in each year, and then compare the
change before and after when the nonstop ights entered each market.19 These elasticities
play an important role in policy analysis. The elasticity matrix is constructed for each market
in each year. An element in a elasticity matrix provides the percentage change in demand for
the row rm due to the price change of the column rm. The elements on the diagonal of each
matrix are the average own-price elasticity of demand for a rm, while the o¤-diagonal elements
represent the average cross-price elasticities of demand among rms. The price elasticities of
the market shares in the nested logit model are
jk =
@sj
@pk
pk
sj
=
8>><>>:

 1pj[1  sjjg   (1  )sj] if j = k
pk(

1 skjg + sk) if j; k  same group
0 otherwise
Table 1.10-1.13 shows the estimated elasticity matrices for the four opened U.S.-China
markets. For example, the elasticities for the Washington, D.C.-Beijing market from 2005
to 2010 are presented in the rst panel. The estimates for 2005 suggest that a 1 percent
increase in American Airlines(AA) price would lead to a 1.56 percent drop in demand for
AA. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in Delta Airlines(DL) price will reduce the demand for
DL by 1.1 percent. In contrast, the cross-price elasticities suggest that a 1 percent increase in
United Airlines(UA) price will increase AAs demand by 0.00007 percent, while a 1 percent
increase in AAs price will increase UAs demand by 0.00001 percent.
In general, the magnitudes of cross-price elasticities were very small and did not change
19Firms are referred to as alliances represented by three major U.S. airlines. F1=AA (OneWorld alliance),
F2=DL (Sky Team alliance), F3=UA (Star Alliance)
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much from year to year, which indicates that products from each of the three rms are not
close substitutes for each other. On the other hand, the own-price elasticities experienced
changes after the rm o¤ered new products. In the Washington, D.C.-Beijing market, for
example, with the introduction of direct ights by UA in 2007, the demand became slightly
less price-sensitive for UA, decreasing in absolute value from 1.60 to 1.57. For the other
three markets (Seattle-Beijing, Newark-Shanghai, and Detroit-Shanghai) where new direct
ghts were introduced in 2009, the demand for the rms that o¤ered new products became
substantially less price-sensitive. For example, in the Newark-Shanghai market presented in
the third panel, the addition of direct ights resulted in a reduction of UAs own-price elasticity
by 28 percent. These ndings are intuitively consistent, since providing new products allows
a rm to gain more market power, although it also depends on changes in the rms marginal
cost and the actions of the airlines rivals.
1.6 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I use the estimates from the structural model to perform counterfactual analysis,
which reveals how the introduction of new products a¤ects equilibrium price and consumer
welfare. The counterfactual analysis tries to answer the question: How would the equilibrium
price and consumer welfare change if the new products were removed?
With the estimated marginal cost parameters, I rst recover the marginal cost by Equation
(1.3), then solve for the predicted equilibrium prices for the period excluding the new products.
Following Nevo (2000), the price can be predicted using Equation (1.3) by changing the matrix
to old accordingly. Then the predicted prices can be compared to the actual prices, and we
can analyze the impact on the markets when new products were introduced.
Similar to the simulation technique in Nevo (2000), the supply parameters are set to the
estimates as shown in Table 1.9. I remove the new products introduced after 2007 while holding
the market conditions constant, and then simulate the market equilibrium for the four opened
markets.
The marginal costs for each product are recovered using the marginal cost parameter
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estimates
M^Cj = exp(Wj ^) + !^j
Then the simulated price p can be solved using the price equation (1.3)
pj = ^MCj+ 1old sj(p; x; ; d)
The actual prices serve as a benchmark to compare with simulated prices p. The di¤erence
between p and p reveals how the equilibrium price changes as a result of the introduction of
new products. The summary of comparison is presented in Table 1.14. Without the introduc-
tion of new products, the average prices for the opened markets are predicted to be higher than
they are with the new products. For example, in the Washington, D.C.-Beijing market, the
simulated prices after the year 2007 are on average 10 percent higher than the actual prices.
The only exception occurs in 2008 where the predicted price turns out to be lower than the
observed price at that time.20 These ndings are consistent with the results from the reduced
form estimation, where a reduction of airfare was found to be associated with the introduction
of direct ights.
One of the measures for consumer welfare is the consumer surplus. In the nested logit
demand model, the expression for consumer surplus is
CS =
1

ln(1 +
X
g
D(1 )g )
In order to examine the change in consumer welfare due to the introduction of new products,
the consumer surplus is calculated in two cases. On one hand, I calculate the consumer surplus,
CS(p), for the year 2007-2010 based on the observed equilibrium prices. On the other hand,
assuming all the new products were removed, I calculate the consumer surplus, CS(p), for
20One potential explanation would be the Olympic Game held in Beijing in 2008, which increased the demand
for air travel to Beijing and resulted in higher airfares in the routes related to Beijing.
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the same period based on the simulated prices. Therefore, the di¤erence between CS(p) and
CS(p) would reect the change in consumer welfare that is associated with the liberalization.
I nd that CS(p) = 3:35 and CS(p) = 2:89. In fact, the consumer surplus decreased by 14
percent if the new products were removed, which is evidence that the introduction of direct
ights did benet consumers.
The estimation of a structural model also allows me to decompose the e¤ect of new direct
ights into their e¤ects on demand and supply, which provides a better understanding on
the market e¤ect associated with the Amendment. The reduced-form regressions estimate the
changes in price and quantity pre- and post- the opening up of markets, which are combination
of e¤ects from the demand side and the supply side. A structural model aims to understand
the demand changes and the airline pricing behavior changes separately.
The actual prices and recovered marginal costs are summarized in Table 1.15, where both
are averaged at rm level in each year. In the year 2009, the nonstop ights in the Seattle
(SEA)-Beijing (PEK) and Detroit (DTW)-Shanghai (PVG) route started and were operated
by Delta Airlines (DL), while the nonstop ights in Newark (EWR)-Shanghai (PVG) route
started and were operated by United Airlines (UA). To investigate the introduction of new
products, I present the observed prices and recovered marginal costs for two years before and
after 2009. Table 1.15 shows that Delta Airlines experienced a slight increase (approximately 1
percent) in marginal cost between 2008 and 2009, while United Airlines saw a subtle decrease
(approximately 0.2 percent) in marginal cost.
Since the reduced-form model suggests the evidence that the price e¤ects associated with
the introduction of direct ights is a 9 percent decrease on average, which is a combination of
impacts on demand and supply, the heterogenous e¤ects on marginal cost pick up the change in
cost for a rm. Given the expected demand-increasing e¤ect associated with the introduction
of nonstop ights on those routes, which would push up prices, the increase in average marginal
cost suggests a drop in mark-up on average, which could be due to the increased competition
in these markets.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the airline market and the bilateral aviation agreement between the U.S.
and China. The expansion from the 2007 Amendment liberalized the market with respect to
routes, carriers, and tra¢ c volume. I nd that the introduction of direct ights leads to a 9
percent reduction in airfare and a 100 percent increase in air tra¢ c volume in those opened
markets. This expansion also has a spillover e¤ect on other beyond-gateway markets, which
is a 43 percent reduction in price. I also estimate a structural econometric model of demand
and supply for air travel, which allows for a decomposition of e¤ect of new direct ights into
their e¤ect on demand and supply. I use the demand parameter estimates to calculate the
own- and cross- price elasticities among rms, which play an important role in policy analysis
with respect to demand. By simulating the price and recovering the marginal costs in the case
where new products are removed, I nd that the predicted prices are higher than the observed
prices, the consume welfare is improved, and the average marginal cost decreased. These
results suggest the impacts of the 2007 Amendment to the Aviation Agreement on the U.S.-
China airline market, which will be helpful for policymakers when considering liberalization in
the future.
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Chapter 2
Price and Output E¤ects of Code-share in the
U.S.-China Airline Market
2.1 Introduction
As international airlines have expanded in recent decades, increasing demand for air travel
between the U.S. and China has prompted U.S. airlines to forge alliances with their overseas
counterparts in China in order to extend the reach of their network. In general, carriers o¤er
service on routes between their hubs and the largest international cities and transfer passengers
to foreign carriers if their destinations are beyond these large cities. This cooperation represents
the airline industrys strategic response to regulatory barriers that prevent any one carrier from
expanding its international network.
An airline alliance is an agreement between two or more airlines to cooperate on a substan-
tial level. The three largest passenger alliances are the Star Alliance, SkyTeam and OneWorld.
In 2004, carriers from the U.S. and China became involved in Star Alliance and Sky Team
Alliance,1 where they have code-share agreements with their alliance partners. While non-
alliance interline service su¤ers from a double marginalization problem, this problem could be
partly internalized by an alliance. Within an alliance, the multi-carrier (interline) itineraries
mimic single carrier (online) service, and the alliance partners can reap some of the benets
associated with the online service, for example, reducing layovers and increasing frequencies.
Code-share ights between these airlines are, for the most part, seamless. With code-
sharing, a trip is ticketed as if it occurred on a single carrier, even though some of the route
1The 2004 Amendment allowed carriers from each country to serve any city in the other country, and
permitted unlimited code-sharing between U.S. and Chinese airlines, which was previously restricted to certain
cities.
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segments are operated by the code-share partner. In addition, trips under code-share have
more exibility in the price than under the traditional interline arrangement.
Given the increasing globalization of the world economy, especially the rapidly growing
economy of China and the consequent increasing demand for international air travel, it is
important to study the impact of cooperation among international carriers. Compared to the
impact on passenger convenience, it is much easier to measure the impact of airline cooperation
on fare and output (number of passengers). This paper examines the e¤ect of code-sharing
on fares and output for interline trips in a large sample of international city-pair markets.
However, we do not investigate the e¤ect of code-sharing on fares for nonstop travel on a single
carrier between international gateway airports. According to the empirical results, I nd that
code-sharing among international carriers generates substantial fare benet for passengers. I
also nd that code-sharing is associated with greater number of international passengers.
The next section details the DB1B data set. Section 3 presents the summary statistics and
empirical results. Section 4 discusses the major ndings and conclusions.
2.2 Data Source
The data used for the empirical analysis comes from the quarterly Origin and Destination
Survey by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Airline Origin and Destination
Survey (DB1B) is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. The sample includes
all tra¢ c either ticketed by U.S. carriers or where a U.S. carrier operated at least one segment.
Each observation is an itinerary with origin, destination, fare, connecting airports, number of
sampled passengers and other itinerary details.
This analysis uses the data for the third quarter of each year from 2005 through 2009. In
order to study the e¤ect of airline alliances between U.S. and China, the data is restricted to
U.S.-China tra¢ c. Several adjustments were made to the data to correct for data problems and
allow for regression analysis. Itineraries were deleted if the fare was likely in error according
to the DOTs Dollar Credibility Indicator. Itineraries with a one-way component exceeding 4
coupon segments were deleted. Itineraries with unknown carrier codes or origins, destinations,
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or stops outside of the continental U.S. and China were deleted. Commuter carriers were
re-coded to their major carrier partners.
Each itinerary was broken into its one-way components, and half of the fare was applied
to each direction. Itineraries with more than two carriers were deleted in order to compare
the fares for alliances to fares for traditional interline and online services. In this paper, I
constructed a broader measure of airline cooperation by assuming that airline partners would
behave cooperatively in all the markets they serve. Carriers with a code-sharing agreement
were identied as alliance partners, even though their code-share activity may have been
limited to a certain set of markets.
The data were aggregated to the route-carrier level. Each observation is an itinerary that
is unique to the origin-destination pair and the operating carrier or carrier pair. Therefore,
each origin-destination pair will have multiple observations if there is more than one carrier or
carrier pair o¤ering service on that market.
There are four basic categories for the international routes, two of which are included in
the empirical analysis for this paper: behind-to-gateway routes and behind-to-beyond routes.
Behind-to-gateway includes routes between a non-gateway U.S. airport and a foreign gateway
airport, where U.S. carriers can provide online service, but foreign carriers can only serve
the route in conjunction with a U.S. carrier. Behind-to-beyond routes are between two non-
gateway airports, thus only interline service is possible, either alliance or non-alliance. Since
foreign carriers cannot have online service on either of these route types, all service on these is
sampled by the DOT, providing a complete picture of service on these routes. Excluding some
routes is necessary because, in this empirical analysis, an itinerary has to have a segment on
a U.S. carrier to be reportable to the DOT. The excluded categories are gateway-to-gateway
and gateway-to-beyond routes, where a substantial amount of tra¢ c is taken by online service
of foreign carriers which can go unobserved and potentially bias the empirical result.
Data on alliance, code-share agreement and their e¤ective dates are listed in Table 2.1.
There are seven code-sharing agreements that appear in two of the airline alliances, Star
Alliance and Sky Team, over the ve-year period. The rst alliance was formed between
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Continental Airlines (CO) and China Southern Airlines (CZ) in 2004. The two airlines began
code-sharing since they were both in the Sky Team Alliance. Most of the other alliances and
code-sharing agreements began in 2007, and continued throughout the entire sample period.
For this data, there are 1237 di¤erent routes between cities in the U.S. and China, and
there are 34 carriers involved. The summary statistics for this data set are presented in Table
2.2. For this route-carrier data set, the average fare (Avg. Fare) is $1051, itineraries have
an average of 2.1 coupon segments (Avg. Coup), and 37% of them are from one-way travel
itineraries (Pct OW). In a quarter, the average number of sampled passengers on each route
(Mkt_Pax) is 30.8, corresponding to 308 actual passengers. Dummy variables are used to
indicate whether the service was single carrier (Online) or code-share alliance (code-share).
In summary, in this data set, 65% of service is online, 6% is code-sharing, and the rest is
non-alliance service.
Competition in the markets is measured using Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Similar
to Brueckner (2003) and Whalen (2007) , separate HHIs were calculated for carriers o¤ering
online service or alliance (HHI_Oa), and for carriers o¤ering only non-alliance interline service
(HHI_Int). This is because competition mainly comes from carriers o¤ering online service or
alliance interline service; however, competition could also come from carriers providing non-
alliance interline service, but one could argue that the pricing of the latter type could heavily
depend on International Air Transport Association (IATA) and its pricing may reect some
cartel behavior. When calculating shares to get HHI, passengers traveling on code-sharing
alliances were divided equally between the two carriers.
2.2.1 Estimation Strategy
I estimate the reduced form regression of price and output. In particular, xed e¤ect regressions
were estimated to measure the price e¤ect and output e¤ect of di¤erent types of service. The
basic form of regression equation for price and output is listed below.
DepV arimt = f (Onlineimt; code  shareit; AvgCoupimt;AvgDistimt;
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PctOWimt;HHI_Oamt;HHI_Intmt; Y earEffectst;
CarrierEffectsi; RouteEffectsm)
In this regression, the subscript i refers to the carrier, m refers to the route or market,
t refers to the year. On the left-hand-side, DepV ar is the log transformation of price in the
price regression and log transformation of number of passengers in the output regression. The
route e¤ects in the regression equation would be di¤erenced out using xed e¤ects. Carrier
dummy variables are constructed to control for the carrier-specic e¤ect, in particular, the
carrier e¤ect variable is set to 1 for online service and 1/2 for each carrier providing interline
service. Year dummies were included to capture time-specic e¤ects.
Previous theory suggests that alliance service, such as code-sharing and immunized alliance,
could internalize the double marginalization problem and result in lower fares than non-alliance
interline service. Moreover, under the code-sharing agreement, the bilateral prorate negotia-
tions are more e¢ cient than fares set through the IATA process. So in the price regression we
would expect the signs of coe¢ cients on the variables measuring online and alliance service
(Online, code-share) to be negative.
The HHIs will be treated as endogenous in some specications of the regression analysis.
In this case, the lagged HHIs will be included as instruments for all service, online, alliance,
and interline service. A detailed discussion will be presented below.
2.3 Regression Results
2.3.1 Price Regressions
Table 2.3 presents the results of the xed e¤ects estimation on price. The OLS regressions are
included in the rst two columns. The rst specication in OLS(1) includes the time e¤ects
and route e¤ects, while OLS(2) includes carrier specic e¤ects in addition. The third and
fourth, IV(3) and IV(4), repeat these specications using the lagged HHI as instruments to
control for the potential endogeneity of the HHIs.
All of the regressions produce results that are consistent with what we expected on the
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coe¢ cients of interests. According to Table 2.3, I nd that the e¤ect of online service on
fares is highly statistically signicant across all of the specications, and is quantitatively
higher when carrier-specic e¤ects are included in both OLS and IV regression. In the rst
specication OLS(1), online service is associated with 6% lower fares compared to non-alliance
interline service. In the second specication OLS(2) where carrier-specic e¤ects are included,
the e¤ect of online rises to 23%. The e¤ects are similar in the IV estimates, where without
carrier-specic e¤ects online service has fares that are 6% lower, and moving to 23% lower
with carrier-specic e¤ects being included. These results suggest that carriers are not able to
price non-alliance interline service e¢ ciently.
The results for code-sharing suggest that the e¤ect of code-sharing on fares is statistically
signicant only when the carrier-specic e¤ects were included, and they are qualitatively similar
in both OLS and IV specication. In both of the OLS and IV regression, code-sharing is not
statistically signicant without the carrier e¤ects, while it is associated with 11% lower fares
as compared to the non-alliance interline service. Unlike the online result, adding the carrier-
specic e¤ect does have signicant impact on the coe¢ cients. This is not surprising given the
expectation that low-price carriers would be more likely to enter into code-sharing agreements
to escape the IATA process. Moreover, it is important to notice that code-sharing has roughly
half of the e¤ect of online service.
For all the other coe¢ cients, I nd that increases in number of coupons result in slightly
higher fares, which is unusual since itineraries with more connections are less preferred. Both
coe¢ cients on HHI_Oa and HHI_Int are signicant, suggesting that an increase in concen-
tration of online and alliance service is associated with higher fares, and an increase in concen-
tration of non-alliance interline service is also associated with higher fares. The former results
for HHI_Oa is unusual, which is likely due to correlation between HHI_Oa and some other
unobservables.
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2.3.2 Output Regressions
Table 2.4 contains the results of the xed e¤ects estimation on output. In the basic regression
equation, the dependent variable is the log transformation of number of passengers on a route.
According to the results, it is consistent with the price e¤ects that online service and code-
sharing alliance are associated with large and signicant increases in output when the carrier-
specic e¤ects are included.
In Table 2.4, the e¤ects of online service on fares is quantitatively similar across all of the
specications. Without carrier-specic e¤ects, online service is associated with 1% increase in
output; while with carrier-specic e¤ects, online service has 2% lower output than non-alliance
interline service. The inclusion of carrier-specic e¤ects raises the e¤ect of the online service
on the number of passengers, which suggests that carriers with higher output are more likely
to o¤er online service. Columns (2) and (4) suggest that having a code-sharing agreement
could have 1% increase in output.
All the other coe¢ cients are generally consistent with our expectations. An increase in
average number of coupons (Avg.Coup) is associated with less output, because additional
connections are not preferred by passengers. The HHI_Oa, which measures the competition
for carriers o¤ering online or alliance service, has a negative and signicant sign, suggesting
that increased concentration is associated with lower output. However, for the HHI_Int, which
measures the competition in non-alliance service, the coe¢ cients are not even statistically
signicant, suggesting that HHI_Int does not have an impact on output.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper uses a 5-year panel of data to examine the e¤ects of airline alliances on price and
output in the U.S. - China markets. The results suggest that code-sharing is associated with
signicantly lower fares compared to non-alliance interline service. These results suggest that
code-sharing fares are 11% lower as compared to non-alliance interline service. This paper also
nds that online service is associated with 23% lower fares than non-alliance interline service.
Because online service does not su¤er from the double marginalization problem as found in
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code-sharing agreements, it is reasonable that code-sharing fares have roughly half of the e¤ect
as online service. However, it seems likely that code-sharing, while not su¢ cient to eliminate
the externality, still brings some benet to the passengers. Consistent with the results for
price, online and code-sharing alliances are associated with an increase in output.
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Chapter 3
E¤ects of the Merger between Code-sharing Airlines
on the U.S.-China Route
3.1 Introduction
One merger of particular interest in the airline industry is the merger between Delta Airlines
and Northwest Airlines which was approved by the Department of Justice in October 2008.
After these two airlines combined, the "new Delta" network was based in the Atlanta and
Detroit hubs. The merger of these two carriers formed the largest commercial airline in the
world.
Mergers between airlines can be driven by both domestic and international competition
incentives, but may have di¤erent impacts on domestic and international markets. There are
two forces that result from a merger. On one hand, a merger could decrease competition, espe-
cially when it occurs between airlines that were code-share partners. In some cases, dramatic
price increases could happen on routes where the airlines competed prior to their merger, and
even code-sharing between airlines with signicant overlapping routes would bring concerns
about competition. On the other hand, a merger could bring prices down due to the cost
e¢ ciencies created in the merger. This paper aims to estimate the impact of a merger between
two domestic airlines on the prices for their code-share products in one of their international
markets.
Airline companies o¤er di¤erent types of products for an itinerary, including online (single
carrier) and code-share (multiple carrier) products. For international air travel, code-share
could happen between airline partners with a code-share agreement. Code-sharing and mergers
share similarities. People commonly think that code-sharing would reduce competition as the
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collusion issue in a merger. However, when we carefully examine a code-share agreement, it
is not simply like a merger where the merged airlines set prices together. We were not able to
observe the compensation mechanism in the contract process for code-share partners, but the
basic structure is clear. In a code-share agreement, the operating carrier (Carrier A) sells
seats on its ights to the ticketing carrier (Carrier B) at an agreed lower price. Carrier B
then re-sell these seats to its customers. In fact, since Carrier A and B are selling extremely
similar products, which are the seats on the same plane, they are competing with each other.
This competitive situation may still lead to lower prices, rather than a higher price as a result
of a double marginalization problem or a potential collusion on price.
Unlike the domestic airline market where code-share happens between domestic carriers,
code-share in the international markets usually takes place between domestic carriers and
their foreign partners. A merger could have a more signicant e¤ect in the markets where the
code-share existed prior to the merger.
Airline merger cases have been studied for various reasons. Previous literature investigat-
ing airline mergers includes Borenstain (1990, 1992), Brueckner and Spiller (1991), Morrison
(1996), Peters (2006), Martin (2011), Gayle and Brown (2012), and Luo (2014). Most of the
previous studies have examined the e¤ects of mergers on fares and network competition. For
example, Morrison(1996) studied three mergers in the 1980s using a long-run approach. For
the case of Delta and Northwest merger, Brown and Gayle(2009) analyzed the potential e¤ects
of this merger using pre-merger data and a structural model.
This paper studies the impact of Delta and Northwest merger on their international routes,
focusing on the U.S.-China routes. The U.S.-China market provides a good sample for this
study. The structure and network in this market are clear, with ve major U.S. carriers in-
volved, covering three gateway cities in China and eight in the U.S. The benet of studying
this market comes from eliminating heterogeneity and allowing to focus on the markets char-
acteristics. Based on the observed code-share and online products before and after the merger.
Specically, I estimate the price e¤ects associated with the merger on code-share products.
This paper empirically tests whether code-sharing is similar to merger by estimating the im-
55
pact of merger on the former code-share markets. This analysis provides empirical evidence
and guidance for policymakers.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data source for the empirical
analysis, and presents some related summary statistics. Section 3 includes the estimation
strategy and the regression result. Section 4 is the conclusion.
3.2 Data Description
The data used for empirical analysis is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (known as
DB1B) provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), which represents a 10
percent random sample of airline tickets from the U.S. reporting carriers. The data set used
for this paper covers international air travel to and from the U.S. over the period 2005-2010,
and it contains detailed itinerary information for each ticket, including airfare paid by each
passenger, origin and destination airports, connecting airports, travel distance, ticketing and
operating carrier for each segment, and the number of passengers on each itinerary with the
same fare. This data allows an examination of fares and competition on routes one year before
and after the merger.
Since this paper focuses on the carriers and their products, tickets with missing operating
carrier or ticketing carrier are eliminated from the sample. I restrict the sample to the air travel
tickets reported by ve major carriers, including United Airlines (UA), Northwest Airlines
(NW), Continental Airlines (CO) 1, American Airlines (AA), and Delta Airlines (DL). In
order to identify the tickets which were code-share products provided by each carrier, the
feeder/regional carriers are re-coded to their major company and, therefore, are not counted
as code-share product. For example, SkyWest Airlines (OO) was operating carrier for United
(UA), American (AA), and Delta (DL), and accordingly re-coded to match the name of one
of these major companies. A list of code-share ticketing carriers involved in the nal sample
is presented in Table 3.1.
1Continental and United merged later in 2010, but they are treated separately here.
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3.2.1 Summary Statistics
A market is dened as a directional pair of origin and destination. Each itinerary has more
than one segment with both operating carriers and ticketing carriers. An itinerary is an online
product if it has a single ticketing carrier and operating carrier over the whole trip. However,
an itinerary could have di¤erent ticketing carriers on di¤erent segments, or have a di¤erent
operating carrier and ticketing carrier within one or more segments. In this case, it is dened as
a code-share product. A U.S. carrier could code-share with either domestic airlines or foreign
airlines based on the alliance agreements among them. In international travel, most code-share
involves a foreign carrier as part of the itinerary.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 present a summary statistic on the market share for each carrier.
Among the ve U.S. carriers, United Airlines (UA) is the one that takes most of the market
share, ranging from 57 percent in 2005 when United Airlines enjoyed a advantage from au-
thorized routes, to 44 percent in 2010 when other carriers competed for passengers with more
access to routes as a result of liberalization.
Each carrier code-shares with their domestic and foreign partners, from either alliance
members or code-share agreements. United Airlines did not have many code-share products,
declining from 20 percent in 2005 to around 12 percent in 2010. This happened because
United entered the U.S.-China airline market at a very early stage with an advantage in a few
authorized routes, and therefore did not require much code-sharing with other carriers except
for the foreign spokes. American Airlines had almost all products code-shared in 2005, and
experienced a substantial drop to as low as 39 percent of code-share products in 2006 when
granted nonstop Chicago (ORD)-Shanghai (PVG) route. Thereafter, the code-share products
uctuated around 30 percent. Continental Airlines (CO) is also one of the carriers that have
operated several nonstop routes since the mid 2000s. Before merging with United Airlines in
2010, Continental had a low percentage of code-share products, ranking next to United.
Northwest Airlines (NW) had a market share second to United Airlines, which is 30-50
percent of Uniteds market share. Northwest mostly o¤ered online products, since it had
access to the U.S.-Japan routes serving as a bridge to China. However, the absence of nonstop
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routes to China still created a limitation on Northwests market share competing with United.
The name of Northwest disappeared in 2010, one year after the merger with Delta. Therefore,
we do not observe any tickets reported by Northwest in 2010.
In 2008, Delta merged with Northwest; in the same year, Delta started the nonstop route
in Shanghai-Atlanta. Until 2007, all of Deltas products were code-share products with one or
more carriers. In 2008, Delta experienced a dramatic drop in code-sharing to 15 percent. We
observe a rebound in code-sharing for Delta in 2009, 62 percent of which involved Northwest.
The percentage of code-share for Delta dropped again in 2010 back to 11 percent, even lower
than 2008.
Before Delta and Northwest merged, they not only code-shared with each other, but also
with other domestic and foreign airlines. Delta and Northwest still reported separately in 2009
one year after they merged, so we still observe code-share products between them. From 2010,
Northwest disappeared from the data, and we do not see any code-share between them. For
Northwest, the code-share products with Delta account for up 5 percent of its total code-share
products in 2005 and 2006; however, this number jumped to around 20 percent in 2008 and
2009, moving to 92 percent in 2009 when the merger completed. For Delta, on the other hand,
the code-share products with Northwest account for at most 5 percent of total code-share
products over 2005 to 2008, with a sharp increase to 62 percent in 2009.
On the market level, Delta and Northwest code-shared in 15 markets in 2008, which are
presented in Table 3.4. Delta and Northwest were observed to have code-sharing over 142
markets in 2009 after they merged, but this is considered as aggregate behavior after merger
since for some reason they still report separately to the DOT. In 2010, Northwests name
disappeared, and we do not observe any code-share between Delta and Northwest in 2010.
Given the nature of airline industry, it usually takes a long time for the merged carriers to
adjust to the new environment including setting new pricing strategies and network strategies.
In this case, we observe the new Deltaone year after the merger occurred.
In the markets where Delta and Northwest code-shared prior to the merger, there were
other competing carriers (United, Continental, and American Airlines) o¤ering service in 80
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percent (12 out of 15) of these markets before the merger, and in 87 percent (13 out of 15)
after the merger. Therefore, any fare change should not simply attributed to the elimination
of competition between Delta and Northwest. Table 3.5 presents a statistical summary of price
trend for these carriers in the year 2008 and 2009.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The main question that this paper aims to answer is: How does the merger a¤ect the price
in the markets where Delta and Northwest previously code-shared before the merger. This
short-run analysis examines the fare changes one year after the merger relative to the fares in
the year before merger. I use xed e¤ect regression to estimate the price e¤ects of the merger
by comparing the fares in markets where Delta and Northwest had code-shared with those in
three types of control groups. The control groups include the following types of markets: (1)
the markets where Delta and Northwest code-share with other carriers; (2) the markets where
Delta and Northwest provide online products (non-code-share) respectively; (3) the markets
where United, Continental and American provide code-share products; and (4) the markets
which is a mix of types (1) and (2)2. The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the
merger, the markets where Delta and Northwest had code-sharing would have a similar price
change as the other three types of markets; therefore, any di¤erence should come from the
merger.
The analysis is formulated by the following estimation
Priceimt = 0 + Y R2009 + Marketm  Y R2009 + Ximt + 1m + 2r + imt (3.1)
The outcome variable is the price for each ticket paid by the passenger. Y R2009 is
a year dummy which equals to 1 if the ticket is observed in the post-merger period, and
Marketmequals to 1 for tickets in the markets where Delta and Northwest code-shared before
2The Type (4) is created in order to increase the number of observations in Type (1)
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merger. I include a set of variables that inuence cost and demand in Ximt, including itinerary
distance, number of stops, nonstop dummy, hub dummy, and origin population. I also include
market dummies and carrier dummies to capture the market xed e¤ects and carrier xed
e¤ects as in 1m and 
2
r .
The parameter of interest is , which captures the change in fares in markets where Delta
and Northwest had code-share before merger relative to the other three markets. Thus,  picks
up the impact from merger by separating out the common trend in price change before and
after the merger.
3.3.2 Regression Results
Table 3.6 presents the estimates of Equation1.1. Column (1)-(3) report the estimates from
the comparison with each control group respectively. Column (4) shows the estimation from
the comparison with a mix of control groups (1) and (2). I nd a signicant decrease in price
for the year after merger in all of the specications. However, for all of the control groups,
I nd that coe¢ cients on the interaction term are statistically insignicant, suggesting that
merger did not have much e¤ect on the routes where Delta and Northwest previously code-
shared relative to either of the above three types of markets. One potential explanation is the
substantial competition from other carriers in the U.S.-China route. In order to have higher
prots, merged rms have the ability to set higher prices due to the gained market power.
However, since all of the major U.S. carriers were competing at the time when the merger
happened, merger did not increase the market power for the new Delta in the U.S.-China
international market. This result also suggests that on the U.S.-China route, the code-sharing
is very similar to a merger.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of Delta and Northwest merger on their U.S.-China routes. I
estimate the price e¤ects associated with the merger on code-share products. The estimation
results suggest that the merger between Delta and Northwest did not have a signicant e¤ect
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on their code-share products on the U.S.-China route. While Chapter 2 nds that code-sharing
brings a negative impact on price due to the elimination of double-marginalization problem,
the merger between domestic carriers does not have a signicant impact on prices for the code-
share products on the U.S.-China route. This paper also empirically tests that code-sharing is
similar to merger by estimating the impact of merger on the former code-share markets. This
analysis provides empirical evidence and guidance for policymakers. More work needs to be
done to understand the e¤ects of the Delta/Northwest merger using a long-run analysis.
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Table 3.1: List of All Code-share Carriers
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Table 3.2: Market Share for Each Carriers
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Table 3.3: Percentage of Code-share Products for Each Carrier
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Table 3.4: List of Markets where DL/NW Code-shared in 2008
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Table 3.5: Price Statistics for Each Control Group
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Table 3.6: Price Regression for the DL/NW Merger
References
Armantier, Olivier, and Oliver Richard. "Evidence on pricing from the Continental Airlines
and Northwest Airlines code-share agreement." Advances in airline economics 1 (2006):
91-108.
Armantier, Olivier, and Oliver Richard. "Domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare."
The RAND Journal of Economics 39, no. 3 (2008): 875-904.
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. "Automobile prices in market equilibrium."
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1995): 841-890.
Berry, Steven T. "Estimating discrete-choice models of product di¤erentiation." The RAND
Journal of Economics (1994): 242-262.
Barwick, Panle Jia, and Steven Berry. "Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the
Airline Industry." (2010).
Borenstein, Severin. "Airline mergers, airport dominance, and market power." The American
Economic Review 80, no. 2 (1990).
Borenstein, Severin. "The evolution of US airline competition." The Journal of Economic
Perspectives (1992): 45-73.
Brueckner, Jan K., and Pablo T. Spiller. "Competition and mergers in airline networks."
International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, no. 3 (1991): 323-342.
Brueckner, Jan K., and W. Tom Whalen. "The Price E¤ects of International Airline Al-
liances*." The Journal of Law and Economics 43, no. 2 (2000): 503-546.
67
68
Brueckner, Jan K., Darin Lee, and Ethan S. Singer. "Airline competition and domestic US
airfares: A comprehensive reappraisal." Economics of Transportation 2, no. 1 (2013): 1-17.
Cristea, Anca, David Hummels, and B. Roberson. "Estimating the gains from liberalizing
services trade: the case of passenger aviation." University of Oregon, unpublished manu-
script (2012).
Gayle, Philip G. "Airline code-share alliances and their competitive e¤ects." JL & Econ. 50
(2007): 781.
Gayle, Philip G. "An Empirical Analysis of the Competitive E¤ects of the Delta/Continental/
Northwest Code-Share Alliance." Journal of Law and Economics 51, no. 4 (2008): 743-766.
Gayle, Philip G., and Dave Brown. "Airline Strategic Alliances in Overlapping Markets:
Should Policymakers be Concerned?." Manuscript, Kansas State University (2012).
Israel, Mark, Bryan Keating, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, and Bobby Willig. "Airline network e¤ects
and consumer welfare." Review of Network Economics (2012): 1-36.
Ito, Harumi, and Darin Lee. "Domestic code sharing, alliances, and airfares in the US airline
industry." Journal of Law and Economics 50, no. 2 (2007): 355-380.
Luo, Dan. "The Price E¤ects of the Delta/Northwest Airline Merger." Review of Industrial
Organization 44, no. 1 (2014): 27-48.
Martin, Shane L. "Analysis of prospective airline mergers using a simulated annealing model."
Journal of Air Transport Management 17, no. 2 (2011): 80-87.
Morrison, S. A. (1996). Airline mergers: A longer view. Journal of Transport Economics
and Policy, 237-250.
Morrison, Steven A. "Actual, adjacent, and potential competition: Estimating the full e¤ect
of Southwest Airlines." Journal of transport Economics and Policy (2001): 239-256.
Nevo, Aviv. "Mergers with di¤erentiated products: The case of the ready-to-eat cereal
industry." The RAND Journal of Economics (2000): 395-421.
Peters, Craig. "Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the US
Airline Industry*." Journal of Law and Economics 49, no. 2 (2006): 627-649.
Train, Kenneth. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge university press, 2009.
Whalen, W. Tom. "A panel data analysis of code-sharing, antitrust immunity, and open
skies treaties in international aviation markets." Review of Industrial Organization 30, no.
1 (2007): 39-61.
70
Curriculum Vitae
YANG LI
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, May 2014
Dissertation Title: Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry on the U.S.-China Route
Dissertation Committee: Marc Rysman, Jordi Jaumandreu, Francesco Decarolis
M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston, MA 2012
B.A., Economics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China 2007
B.S., Mathematics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China 2007
FIELDS OF INTEREST
Industrial Organization, Applied Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Econometrics (MA Level), Department of Economics, Boston University,
Spring 2013 and Spring 2012
Teaching Fellow, Statistics (MA Level), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall
2012
Teaching Assistant, Industrial Organization, Boston University, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, International Trade, Boston University, Spring 2011
Teaching Assistant, Public Finance, Boston University, Fall 2010
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2010-Spring 2013
Deans Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2008- Fall 2013
Excellent Student Award, Wuhan University, China, 2007
Excellent Student Scholarship, Wuhan University, China, 2006-2007
71
WORKING PAPERS
E¤ects of the Merger between Code-sharing Airlines on the U.S.-China Route, April
2014.
Liberalization of the Airline Industry on the U.S.-China Route: E¤ects of the 2007 Amend-
ment to the Aviation Agreement,October 2013.
Price and Output E¤ects of Code-sharing in the U.S.-China Airline Market, January
2013.
WORK IN PROGRESS
"The Next Gateway in the U.S.-China Airline Market"
"The E¤ects of Airline Alliances in the Domestic China Airline Market"
LANGUAGES
Chinese (native), English (uent)
COMPUTER SKILLS
STATA, SAS, MATLAB, Scientic WorkPlace, Microsoft O¢ ce
